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Evolutionary psychology as public science and
boundary work
Angela Cassidy
This paper explores the phenomena of public scientific debates, where
scientific controversies are argued out in public fora such as the mass media,
using the case of popular evolutionary psychology in the UK of the 1990s.
An earlier quantitative analysis of the UK press coverage of the subject
(Cassidy, 2005) suggested that academics associated with evolutionary psy-
chology had been unusually active in the media at that time, particularly in
association with the publication of popular science books on the subject.
Previous research by Turner, by Gieryn, and by Bucchi has established the
relationship between such appeals to the public domain and the establishment
of scientific legitimacy and academic disciplinary boundaries. Following this
work, I argue here that popular science has, in this case, provided a creative
space for scientists, outside of the constraints of ordinary academic discourse,
allowing them to reach across scientific boundaries in order to claim expertise
in the study of human beings.
1. Introduction: wrestling in public
What happens when scientists argue in public? As with families and political alliances, on
the whole, scientists tend not to wash their dirty linen in public, confining their disagree-
ments to the more restricted space of academic fora such as journals and conferences. This
leads to what Latour (1987) refers to as the “Janus face” of science, where one (internal)
side speaks of controversy, and the uncertainty and contingency of knowledge, while the
other speaks of scientific truth and consensus. This bifurcation was also described by Gilbert
and Mulkay (1984) as the contrast between “contingent” and “constitutive” aspects of
scientists’ discourse, depending on whether it took place in private or public contexts.
Latour argues it is the task of sociologists of science to investigate the first of these, in order
to understand how “science in the making” works. From time to time, scientific con-
troversies spread from the relatively closed and private spaces of academic journal articles,
conferences and books (with small, professional audiences) to the broader public domain of
less restricted mass media with far larger and less specialized audiences.1 This can often
result in the uncertain and often messy internal face of science becoming exposed of its own
accord. Sometimes, as with the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crisis in the UK,
this is simply because at the time very little is known about the issue at hand, but policy or
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risk concerns demand answers from scientists which do not yet exist, pulling their already
existing disagreements into the public domain. However, there are other times when
scientists will seek out spaces such as the mass media for their own reasons, and use them
to advance their scientific arguments and engage in (sometimes longstanding) controversies
with other scientists. A particularly famous example of this phenomenon, which has now
been ongoing in its modern form since at least the mid 1970s, is that of public scientific
debates over evolutionary theory, as seen in the cartoon in Figure 1, referring centrally to the
debates between evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins and paleontologist Stephen Jay
Gould, which were principally fought out in a series of popular science books and articles
written by both men.
This cartoon comes from a source which could be described as “popular science”:
perhaps best understood as discussions of science in media sources that have a shared and
specific audience of professional scientists and non-professional readers who are interested
in science.2 It uses humor to explore this phenomenon of public scientific controversy, using
the metaphor of a commercial, public fight, such as a wrestling match. This expresses the
ambivalent relationship that many scientists have with the public domain, and with those of
their number who seek to be engaged in this space, which in some ways is quite similar to
the ambivalent relationship society has with professional combat sports.3 On the one hand,
these scientists are admired and valued for their abilities: in writing about and discussing
their subject so clearly and articulately; in their championing of scientific causes; taking on
their opponents; advancing “the public understanding of science”; and in doing what they do
well enough to be enthusiastically cheered on by onlookers. On the other hand, these public
arguments could reflect badly on science: they can be seen as “squabbles,” full of “hollow
rhetoric, pompous quotations and insults” (Brooks, 1998: 51). As in boxing and wrestling, it
seems often the point is to win (knock your opponent out) rather than be productive or to
learn anything: such activities could also be seen as egoistic, macho, over the top,
commercialized, violent and ultimately pointless.
Public debates of this kind draw attention to the sciences, but they also violate many of
the implicit rules of scientific conduct, most notably the peer review process, but also ideas
about scientific discourse being polite, subsuming personal opinions and being above
commercial influences. They also, as described above, disrupt public images of scientific
knowledge as certain, impartial truth, and therefore scientists who become involved in them
have often faced the disapproval expressed in this cartoon, and sometimes this can translate
into negative effects upon their careers (see Goodell, 1977; also Gieryn, 1983). So, when
faced with this kind of disapproval, or at the very least ridicule from their peers, why do
scientists continue to engage in public controversy?
Public science and scientific boundaries
A useful place to start answering such a question can be to look at other cases where
scientists have worked hard at communicating in the public domain, not only in recent years
but also further back in the history of science. Are there any common factors involved in
such cases, in the tactics and language used by scientists when doing this work? It has been
suggested that one purpose of public communication can be to help scientists establish and
maintain their position as knowledge makers supported by the rest of society:
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[S]cientists find they must justify their activities to the political powers and other social
institutions upon whose good will, patronage and cooperation they depend. The body of
rhetoric, argument and polemic produced in this process may be termed public science,
and those who sustain the enterprise may be regarded as public scientists. (Turner,
1980: 589)
Historian of science Frank Turner’s work, on the rhetorical strategies used by Victorian and
early twentieth century scientists, illustrates how they utilized public lectures and popular
writing in essays and periodicals to argue the case for the legitimacy of science, and against
its detractors, such as the church and the early anti-vivisection movement. Working from a
Figure 1. “The Evolutionary War,” Annals of Improbable Research, Vol. 6, No. 5 (September/
October 2000).
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similar perspective, Thomas Gieryn has explored the reasons for scientists’ need to do this
(Gieryn, 1983, 1985, 1999). He discusses attempts to find a set of criteria that can always
distinguish science from “not science,” and concludes that they have been largely un-
successful in describing any characteristics that can apply only to science all of the time.
Therefore, scientists need to convince others that the work they do is legitimate, that their
knowledge claims are valid, that scientists should have jurisdiction over scientific knowl-
edge, and that they should be supported by the rest of society. One way in which this can be
done is to engage in arguments, described as “boundary work,” which demarcates the
difference between “proper,” legitimate scientific activities and other, less legitimate ones.
However, the places at which such boundaries are drawn will constantly change to fit with
the needs of the argument being made and the demands of society at the time. For example,
in the popular writings of the Victorian physicist John Tyndall, science’s empirical, practical
benefits for technological advance were emphasized when distinguishing it from religion;
but its theoretical, abstract side was stressed when separating science from mechanics and
engineering.
For the same reasons that the boundaries between “science” and “non-science” are
constructed and defended, similar rhetorical strategies can be used to create or bolster
support for particular approaches or disciplines within the sciences in order to gain
recognition, funding and support for their work. This can occur on many levels, from the
growth of individual laboratories or new research programs, right up to new disciplines, and
such arguments can be aimed at other scientists, funding bodies, politicians, or wider
publics. Depending upon the intended audience, boundary work can appear in many places,
including academic journals, policy documents, or of course the mass media. Gieryn argues
that episodes concerning the interests of “science” as a whole are most likely to be carried
out in the less restricted fora of the public domain (Gieryn, 1983). However, there are times
when interdisciplinary boundary work also appears in the public domain, as has been
explored by sociologist of science Massimiano Bucchi (1996, 1998). Bucchi describes
several case studies of scientific communication where scientists have bypassed routine
methods of popularization (slowly moving from academic to mass media formats as
knowledge becomes less uncertain), instead reaching out to communicate directly in popular
media forms. The most dramatic example of this can be seen when scientists choose to
announce their findings in press conferences before they are published in an academic
journal, as happened with claims of the discovery of cold fusion (Lewenstein, 1995; Simon,
2001). However, it can take other forms, such as when the Alvarez asteroid impact theory of
the extinction of the dinosaurs was discussed extensively in popular forms prior to its
establishment as a mainstream theory in paleontology (Clemens, 1986). Bucchi, following
Cloitre and Shinn (1985), describes such processes collectively as “deviation,” and although
the term is somewhat problematic, I will continue to use it here, though in a descriptive
rather than normative sense.
What many of these examples have in common is the participation of members of
several different scientific disciplines disputing the issue in question. For example, in the
case of the Alvarez extinction theory, it was developed by a physics–geology team, but
needed to be accepted by paleontologists (the usual specialists dealing with dinosaurs) in
order to establish itself more fully in academia. In such cases, it can be difficult for scientists
in one area to reach those in another because of the highly specialized nature of language
and audiences in academic fora such as journals and conference papers. Because of their
broader audiences and everyday language, mass media forms can provide alternative routes
for communicating beyond disciplinary boundaries and reaching wider academic and other
professional audiences (Dolby, 1982; Phillips et al., 1991). In addition, the public domain
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can also be utilized as a creative space for scientists, where they can operate outside of the
usual constraints of academic discourse, speculating freely about their work and discussing
controversial issues in ways that would not be published in academic journals without
stronger supporting evidence (Felt, 2000: 30).
However, such popular communication has risks as well as benefits, and scientists who
engage in it can find that they are dismissed as publicity seekers, losing credibility with the
very specialist audiences they might hope to reach in this way. Particularly when popular
discussions result in scientific controversy becoming visible in the public domain, these
activities can be highly disruptive to the public image of science as certain, reliable,
knowledge. Therefore, there must be considerable pressure upon scientists before they will
take this route, and Bucchi argues that a source of this can be contests over, or movements
around, the established boundaries between scientific disciplines. This is signified by the
presence of boundary work in the arguments in use in a controversy, which can be directed
at a number of levels of scientific boundary, including those drawn around “science” as a
whole; those created as a new discipline is established; and those between preexisting
disciplines, sub-disciplines and even theoretical approaches within a single area.
Evolutionary psychology
Another, more recent example of public scientific controversy around evolution can be seen
in controversies around evolutionary psychology (EP), which appeared in the UK media
during the late 1990s and early 2000s. In some ways, it can perhaps be best characterized
through some of the claims made by evolutionary psychologists. These were based upon an
argument that human psychology has its origins in our evolutionary history, and included
claims about the evolutionary basis of monogamy, adultery, rape, the glass ceiling and what
(heterosexual) men and women find attractive in a partner. The precise definition of what
“evolutionary psychology” was and is is itself a controversial issue, which I will address in
greater detail later in this article: however, my broad understanding of the term has already
been laid out in a previous publication (Cassidy, 2005). This paper also described earlier
quantitative analysis of the UK press coverage of evolutionary psychology, in which it was
found that this coverage showed some unusual features, compared to routine coverage of the
sciences. Many more academics and book authors were writing their own articles about
evolutionary psychology, rather than appearing as “experts” cited in articles written by
journalists. As time went on, coverage of the subject became increasingly evaluative and
less accepting of the claims made by evolutionary psychologists, to the point where this
coverage developed into a public scientific debate. In addition, a close association was found
between the publications of several popular science books on evolutionary psychology, and
the levels of coverage of the subject. Prior to the appearance of the first popular book to
mention evolutionary psychology, science writer Robert Wright’s (1994) The Moral Animal,
the term “evolutionary psychology” was not in use in the UK press at all. However,
following the book’s US publication, press coverage of evolutionary psychology and of the
book’s author rose and fell together throughout the next two years. A similar effect was
found in 1998 and 1999, with the publication of Steven Pinker’s How the Mind Works
(1998), an evolutionary psychology book that was covered widely in the press and achieved
high sales figures. Several of these books have relatively high citation rates in academic
journals, going into the hundreds in some cases.4 Finally, it was also found that usage of the
phrase “evolutionary psychology” in academic journal articles rose sharply after the main
period of UK press coverage of the subject, which peaked in the year 2000.
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However, because this analysis relied solely upon quantitative methods and data, the
strength of claims that can be made based upon it is limited. A mixed methodology research
design (Brewer and Hunter, 1989) was therefore employed, in which I also carried out
qualitative analysis of the press and other media coverage of evolutionary psychology; and
of a series of semi-structured interviews carried out with academics and media professionals
involved with the controversy. A total of 21 people were interviewed between 1999 and
2002, and participants were approached through a combination of their visibility in the
media, personal contacts and “snowball” strategies.5 Owing to the public profile of many of
these people, and the “live” and frequently heated nature of the controversy, these interviews
were carried out under conditions of anonymity, despite the fact that identifying their precise
position in the controversy could strengthen the analysis. Furthermore, it is worthwhile
emphasizing that, in line with much research carried out in the broad area of science and
technology studies, I have attempted to carry out as close to a “symmetrical” analysis of this
controversy as is possible (Bloor, 1991), i.e. to address the underlying strategies and
interests of all participants in the debate. This is a methodological approach which I feel is
important to attempt, particularly considering the tendency of this kind of research to
become incorporated into one of the sides in a live controversy (Ashmore and Richards,
1996); the heated nature of evolutionary psychology debates; and the participation of my
own research fields in some aspects of the controversy.6
2. Popular evolutionary psychology
One of the most striking features of popular evolutionary psychology in the UK was the way
in which it quickly developed into a controversy, along the lines of and blurring into
previous controversies such as the above mentioned Dawkins–Gould disputes. An important
aspect of this was the flexible and direct way in which the scientists and other actors
involved in the controversy communicated their arguments. As well as providing interviews
and quotes for journalists and press officers to write about, academics involved in the
evolutionary psychology debate engaged in many more “direct” forms of communication,
such as writing press and media articles themselves, appearing on television and radio
discussion programs, giving public lectures and writing popular science books. In addition,
journalists, science writers and other commentators became involved, with some actors
functioning as “experts” in the media alongside the academics.
Although popular books are not often thought of as part of the “mass media,” I would
argue that they have often had important roles to play in the discussion of science in the
public domain, despite the relative lack of attention that has been paid to them in research on
science communication. In particular, such publishing has been central to the public
discussion of evolutionary psychology ideas, with around 25 popular books being published
in the UK on the subject, broadly defined, from 1991 to 2001.7 These continue a
longstanding tradition of popular writing in evolutionary thought, including Darwin’s Origin
of Species (1859), a book written for and read by other learned men as well as the broader
educated public. The Origin was written at a time when there was much less of a division
between so-called “popular” and “technical” writing about science. As science became
increasingly professional and institutionalized through the twentieth century, it became more
normal for most scientists to communicate with one another only in technical journals while
just a few, usually senior, “visible scientists” wrote books specifically intended for wider
publics (Goodell, 1977). However, particularly in the evolutionary arena, popular writing
continued to play important roles, with the popular work of scientists such as Julian Huxley,
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J.B.S. Haldane, Ernst Mayr and Konrad Lorenz. Such discussions of evolution took on a
more modern form during the Sociobiology8 controversy in the mid 1970s, precipitated by
the publication of two popular books—E.O. Wilson’s Sociobiology (1975) and Richard
Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene (1976)—and continued to be discussed at a popular level, largely
but not exclusively through writers such as Dawkins and Gould, through the rest of the
1980s.
During the late 1980s and 1990s, something happened to make popular science
publishing into a much more prominent, and profitable enterprise than it had been for many
years, as described here by a publishing editor working in the area at the time.
When Stephen Hawking’s A Brief History of Time first appeared (in 1988) anyone
familiar with Weinberg’s book [Steven Weinberg’s The First Three Minutes] would
probably have felt reasonably safe in predicting a modest sales performance at least:
like the earlier book: it had a wonderful title, a straightforward writing style, and an
author who was a leading light in the field. (Rodgers, 1992: 231)
What happened instead was that Hawking’s book went on to become, at the time, the biggest
selling popular science book ever, taking its publishers entirely by surprise and propelling
the author to fame and iconic status. Although the subsequent boom in popular science
publishing cannot be ascribed solely to this phenomenon, with scientific institutions,
scientists, publishers and literary agents such as John Brockman9 all playing their part, it is
certainly true that after this period many more popular books were published, prominently
marketed and became bestsellers in the UK. The Aventis (formerly Rhone-Poulenc) prize
for science books has now been for some years a high profile event coveted by authors and
publishers and widely covered in the rest of the media. This prize was set up in 1989, the
year after the publication of Hawking’s book, as was the Edinburgh International Science
Festival, a well attended public festival where many popular authors give talks about their
work, a pattern now followed by the Cheltenham Festival of Science, now in its fourth year.
This pattern of trends in publishing is not unusual: another, more recent example in fiction
can be seen in so called “chick-lit,” following the success of Helen Fielding’s Bridget Jones’
Diary (1996). However, the strength of the pop science boom was such that an entire new
mass market for publishing was opened up, complete with its own trends within the
genre.10
During the 1990s, there was such a trend for biological, evolutionary and brain books,
which evolutionary psychology fitted neatly into and benefited from, as a freelance journalist
describes here, discussing a conversation that he had had with a UK publisher at that
time:
“My god, something exciting’s happening in science, this stuff about genetics, that sort
of science, the Genome Project, and Richard Dawkins sells a lot of books, and we ought
to be up to speed with this.” (R9—freelance generalist journalist)
Although, as I have described, Dawkins has been a successful popular author since the
1970s, he became even more popular at this time, as the re-publication of The Selfish Gene
as a “popular science classic” in 1989 attests. Furthermore, there was also a great deal of
popular discussion and claims made about “the new genetics” leading up to and including
the publication of the first draft of the Human Genome Project in the year 2000, and
evolutionary psychology was seen in popular science circles as closely linked to these
movements. Robert Wright’s The Moral Animal introduced the term “evolutionary psychol-
ogy” into public discussion in the UK in 1994; there were several other books published
over this period which drew strongly upon, or were closely linked with evolutionary
Cassidy: EP as public science and boundary work 181
psychology arguments. Philosopher of science Helena Cronin’s history of altruism and
sexual selection, The Ant and the Peacock was published in 1992, while the science writer
Matt Ridley published evolutionary books in 1994 (The Red Queen, about the evolution of
sex) and 1996 (The Origins of Virtue, on altruism). Finally, cognitive psychologist Steven
Pinker and primatologist Robin Dunbar both wrote on the evolution of language, in
respectively 1994 (The Language Instinct) and 1996 (Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution
of Language). It was also at this time that press usage of “evolutionary psychology” and
wider discussion of evolutionary themes started to take off.
Part of the UK popular science boom included an increased popularity of events where
scientists give talks or lectures, or debate with one another in front of public audiences. Such
activities are not new, and public lectures have been held in this country by organizations
such as the Royal Institution and British Association since the nineteenth century. However,
such events achieved a new frequency and popularity in the 1990s, with the Edinburgh
International Science Festival and many other smaller events appearing at this time. Such
events dovetail neatly with, and were frequently sponsored by, popular science publishers,
and authors with new books out are often to be found speaking at them. Evolutionary
psychologists and their opponents participated fully in this movement, and in fact contrib-
uted to it via the Darwin@LSE program. Darwin@LSE was both a research group based at
the London School of Economics’ Centre for the Philosophy of Natural and Social Science
and a series of public lectures organized by a group of academics between 1995 and 1998.11
The lectures were broadly on the theme of Darwinism, and many of them were given by
evolutionary psychologists and their allies. Members of Darwin@LSE themselves engaged
in popular work, through both books and other media. The program also produced its own
series of popular science books, Darwinism Today, published by Weidenfeld and Nicholson,
and cooperated closely with several publishers, in particular by timing the seminars to
coincide with authors’ book publications and other media appearances, but also more
directly by including publishers’ publicity material with that sent out advertising “Darwin
lectures.”12
The program also networked closely with other media such as newspapers and radio,
maintaining a mailing list for promoting the seminars to journalists and other interested
parties. Many of the media professionals I spoke with reported receiving material from
them; this was the response when I asked what this journalist knew about the program:
In the sense that I’m informed of it any time anything happens, and X rings up and
badgers me from time to time, and certainly is a wonderful leg biter, that is whenever X
sees the press, X bites their legs, and says, “Why don’t you come to my lecture-ettes?”
(R17—science journalist, broadsheet press)
The lectures were very well attended, not only by members of the public, but also by
journalists, columnists, novelists, publishers, and other figures involved in the London media
and intellectual circuit. They took place over the same early period described above, where
evolutionary psychology was establishing itself, as a label and a set of ideas, in the public
domain of the UK.
In many ways, what was the most important aspect of Darwin@LSE was that it
transformed EP from being a fairly backwater science, or discipline, or approach, to
something at the forefront of the public mind. In ‘96, ‘97 it was one of the hottest
tickets to have, you’d go there and you find everybody from John Maynard Smith to
Jonathan Miller to Ian McEwan to Melvyn Bragg. So yes, in terms of bringing it to
public consciousness, or I suppose more importantly of bringing it to the consciousness
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of the media and of policy makers I think it was crucially important. (R12—popular
author, freelance science journalist)
The next major development came in early 1998, with the publication of Steven
Pinker’s How the Mind Works, an explicit argument for the evolutionary psychology
approach to studying humans. How the Mind Works had a highly professional publicity
campaign, and received a phenomenal amount of coverage in the UK media as a whole. As
well as reviews in most of the daily newspapers (during the week and in Saturday editions),
Sunday newspapers and news magazines, this coverage also included extracts and many
other articles and comment pieces about both book and author. Steven Pinker came to
Britain for the publication of the book, and conducted many interviews, book signings, radio
appearances and public lectures, including at Darwin@LSE. This extensive coverage was
reflected in the close association between press mentions of Steven Pinker and of
evolutionary psychology throughout 1998 and much of 1999, a period when coverage of the
subject became much more widespread than before (Cassidy, 2005). After the spring of
1998, the Darwin@LSE lecture series closed, and although members of the group are still
resident at the London School of Economics (LSE), they became very much less active in
the public domain.13
During 1999 and 2000, a number of books appeared which changed the tenor of public
discussions about evolutionary psychology from a largely positive, even celebratory
atmosphere to a distinctly more evaluative one. These books were written by science writers
and academics from a wider range of disciplinary backgrounds, and displayed an equally
broad spread of responses to the claims of evolutionary psychology, ranging from broadly
allied positions, through criticisms on various grounds, to strongly opposed arguments
against EP. There was a range of responses from feminists during 1999, including US
science journalist Natalie Angier’s Woman: an Intimate Geography; feminist psychologist
Lynne Segal’s Why Feminism?; and feminist sociobiologist Sarah Blaffer Hrdy’s Mother
Nature. A selection of other books published at this time addressing evolutionary psychol-
ogy included work by geneticist Steve Jones (Almost Like A Whale: “The Origin of Species”
Updated, 1999); ethologists Patrick Bateson (with P. Martin, Design for a Life, 1999) and
Tim Birkhead (Promiscuity, 2000); and journalist Andrew Brown (The Darwin Wars, 1999).
During this period, evolutionary psychology books also continued to appear, such as Icon
Books’ comic style Introducing Evolutionary Psychology, by Dylan Evans and Oscar
Zarante (1999) and Geoffrey Miller’s The Mating Mind (2000), but the diversity of positions
now on display in the public domain meant that the overall tone of public discussion of EP
had now shifted decisively towards that of a public debate, with much of the press coverage
appearing in a “controversy” framing.
One of the most overt and prominent critiques of evolutionary psychology which
appeared at this time was the collection Alas Poor Darwin: Arguments Against Evolutionary
Psychology, published in June 2000 and edited by the feminist sociologist Hilary Rose and
the neurobiologist Steven Rose, in which academics from the social sciences, biology,
psychology and philosophy wrote essays on the subject (Rose and Rose, 2000). One of the
most important impacts of Alas Poor Darwin was the way in which it provided an “event”
upon which to hang press and other media coverage about evolutionary psychology.14 This
was strongly facilitated by the activities of the editors themselves, who had been involved in
previous controversies in the UK about sociobiology, and are longstanding critics of
political and social aspects of the sciences. Working separately and in concert, they made
themselves visible in the media through writing articles, including extracts of the book itself,
book reviews, public lectures and debates and appearing in other media, such as radio
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discussion programs, to critique and argue against evolutionary psychology positions. Their
work, and the appearance of the book itself, also stimulated further coverage, discussion and
commentary. Just as Darwin@LSE, and the books and authors associated with it, had
brought attention to EP in the first place, the Roses’ book and others like it provided a focus
and resource for other actors, especially lay commentators, to engage with and challenge the
claims made by evolutionary psychologists.
Such patterns of media intervention and visibility occurred, to a greater or lesser extent,
with all of the popular books under discussion in this paper, and indeed in terms of audience
figures, it could be argued that such media coverage is at least as important, and possibly
more so than the content of the books themselves, because the audiences for press
discussions are so much higher. These interactions are crucially important in understanding
media coverage of evolutionary psychology, as well as the broader cultural impacts of
today’s popular science industry.
If it’s a big book, you will get book proofs ideally five to six months ahead, and those
will go to magazines and you will try and pin down the cornerstones of your campaign,
like serialization, color magazines and big interviews . . . Plus, you’re getting out a sort
of word of mouth campaign, so you send it to major reviewers and readers, who you
then get to start reading and talking about it, and you probably have anywhere between
fifty and one hundred people to contact . . . You’re basically then looking at the book,
taking a million notes, finding as many angles as you can, really of people who would
like to review it and why, and of how many “science” stories you can squeeze out of it
for the science pages, how many “social” stories can be spun off, implications of the
science into the other pages beyond the science pages, features, arts, finance, business,
columns, news, a day in the life of, if you have a strange life, personal details can be of
interest, you use every angle you can, think it through and ideally you sell each angle to
a different spot, so really maximizing your coverage as far as possible. (R11—popular
science public relations)
I have quoted this interviewee at length to give an insight into how media campaigns
surrounding modern popular science (and other) books are carried out. This cooperation
between publishers and other media forms, particularly the broadsheet press and radio, is of
course based in longstanding routines surrounding the publication and promotion of new
books, and as such long predates the popular science boom. As well as publishers gaining
exposure and publicity for their books, other media, such as newspapers, are quite happy to
participate with such arrangements because it provides them with reliable, regular, predict-
able and frequently interesting sources of material about which to write. In the case of
evolutionary psychology, it became apparent that the (often academic) authors of popular
books were tapping into these routines, particularly via routes such as Darwin@LSE, in
order to make their argument in the public domain, continuing the pattern of mutual
cooption to the benefit of all concerned. This is highlighted by the quantitative finding that
higher levels of academics were writing directly in the press compared to a similar science
subject at the time (Cassidy, 2005), and many of my interviewees referred to the “popular”
or “public” debate over evolutionary psychology.
Although the Darwin@LSE events only ran for a few short years, largely at a time
before the term “evolutionary psychology” had gained wider currency in the UK public
domain, it was clear from my interviewees that the intervention of this group provided a
crucial “push” for evolutionary psychology to enter into the public domain of the UK during
the 1990s, intimately bound up with the publication of popular science books on the subject.
So why did so many academics make such concerted efforts to present their arguments
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about evolutionary psychology in this way, rather than solely in the academic literature of
the time? Although most of my interviewees felt that it was important for them to write
popular science for what could broadly be termed “democratic” reasons (sharing knowledge;
furthering the “public understanding” of science; providing feedback to society on the work
they do; contributing to public debates over socio/political issues), these kinds of reasons
cannot by themselves explain why so many more academics directly contributed to popular
discussions about EP. Similarly, it could be argued that the subject matter of evolutionary
psychology (human psychology and relationships) is particularly appealing to media and
publics alike, and that academics were simply responding to a demand for popular science in
this area. Again, I believe that this may well be true, and plan to explore this issue in depth
at a later date, but this cannot be the whole story: if it were then there would be many other
kinds of social scientists producing popular material than there currently are. Instead, I will
here focus upon broader institutional reasons why these academics turned to the public
domain in this case, looking at the academic politics at work in and around evolutionary
psychology.
3. The “disciplinary ecology” of evolutionary psychology
In the history and sociology of science, there have been many attempts at mapping out
scientific disciplines, and the relationships between them, in order to better understand how
the sciences work. However, as Thomas Gieryn’s (1999) work has described, such
enterprises have almost inevitably become incorporated into the processes of discipline
building, in which mapping and the associated practice of boundary work, play important
rhetorical roles in creating such relationships. Inevitably, cartographers of science must
occupy a particular disciplinary position themselves, and so their location will affect the way
in which they draw out a map of the sciences. Furthermore, maps are designed to represent
a relatively static situation, such as a landscape, and so struggle to cope with the relatively
fast pace of change as the sciences develop. Gieryn suggests that perhaps a more productive
way of thinking about academic science, and the complex of disciplines which make it up,
can be through the use of an ecological metaphor. In a biological ecosystem, animals, plants
and the environment are understood to coexist within an interconnected system in which
each organism has developed a particular role, or niche from which it interacts with the rest
of the system. He argues that such a metaphor can be extended as an aid in understanding
society as a large dynamic system of social groups and actors, of which academia and
science are a fundamental part, with their own internal “ecology” comprised of professional
disciplines:15
But science has not always had its niche, nor are the boundaries of its present niche
permanent. The intellectual ecosystem has with time been carved up into “separate”
institutional and professional niches through continuing processes of boundary work
designed to achieve an apparent differentiation of goals, methods, capabilities and
substantive expertise. (Gieryn, 1983: 783)
Such a move has a number of advantages, but most fundamentally, an ecology is a dynamic
system which changes over time, leading to an understanding of disciplinary relationships,
and of society itself, as similarly dynamic. This acknowledges the importance of historical
factors contributing to the present situation, as well as the likeliness of future change. The
idea that today’s sciences have been and continue to be shaped by their interactions with
each other and the rest of society is also an important one, which has been developed further
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by researchers in the history and sociology of science using social worlds theory in their
work (see, e.g., Clarke, 1990, 1998; Star and Griessemer, 1989). Social worlds are groups of
people who work together to achieve a particular goal or goals, and produce common modes
of practice in doing so. As such, the sciences can be seen as social worlds, and their mutual
interactions produce and reproduce the disciplinary structures seen in modern science. An
ecological (and social worlds) view of the sciences has one further advantage: it can be used
to understand the multiple levels of interaction between scientific disciplines, sub-disciplines
and research approaches within science, as well as the broader interactions between science
and the rest of society at the same time.
Following in this tradition, I will now explore some of the ways in which evolutionary
psychology challenged, destabilized, subverted, constituted and reinforced the established
boundaries within and around the current social worlds of those disciplines concerned with
studying human behavior, relationships, society and cultures. I will also use Harry Collins’
concept of the “core set” (the central, often very small group of scientists directly involved
in experimentation and theorization about a particular scientific issue) to illustrate how these
boundaries exist in a series of layers radiating out from those contested around evolutionary
psychology itself (Collins, 1985; Collins and Evans, 2002). These will be illustrated through
examples of the boundary work performed around popular evolutionary psychology, in
interviews with participants in the debate, as well as media coverage of the subject.
Evolutionary psychology: the core-set
When conducting interviews for this research, I quickly found that asking actors to give a
definition of evolutionary psychology was a simple and rather revealing way of beginning,
providing a good way of engaging people whilst breaking the ice in a new encounter. I
rapidly found that many people struggled with their answers, and sometimes actively
resisted my attempts to find out what they thought “evolutionary psychology” meant. The
answers I got back were enormously varied, as indeed are the descriptions and definitions of
evolutionary psychology that have appeared in print. In fact, as this answer suggests, it may
be this very quality which has helped evolutionary psychology in gaining currency in both
popular and academic discussions of the subject.
What it [evolutionary psychology] is actually, it is the attempt to put forward evolved
adaptations in the human mind . . . I think in pop terms, I mean my own rough . . . Like
any catchphrase like that, it’s also an aspiration, it’s a research program, it’s a, you
know, it’s practically got a tool for picking things out of horses’ hooves! (R1—popular
author and freelance science journalist)
Of course, there is a certain paradox in attempting a description of evolutionary psychology
in an article analyzing the arguments and rhetorical devices used in just such definitions.
Like Gieryn’s cartographers of science, I have an inescapable, albeit complex location in
these debates, which will in turn affect my analysis.16 However, my description of these
relationships should be understood not only as partial, but also as a snapshot of a dynamic
and rapidly changing situation. Also, rather than trying to define the boundaries of
“evolutionary psychology,” I would instead like to describe my understanding of the “core-
set” of actors, locations and concepts associated with the subject, which I have done by
tracing them back to the origins of the term itself.
The first people to write about evolutionary psychology, and the originators of the label
in the late 1980s were a small group of North American cognitive and social psychologists
and anthropologists. This core group included two central research teams: psychologist Leda
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Cosmides and anthropologist John Tooby; and Canadian psychologists Martin Daly and
Margo Wilson; as well as social psychologist David Buss; cognitive psychologist and
linguist Steven Pinker; and anthropologist Donald Symons, who was involved with
sociobiology since the late 1970s. In the wake of this group, many other academics have
adopted their ideas, based in a wider range of disciplines: still in psychology and
anthropology, but also in philosophy, economics, law, management and advertising. This
second group is also more geographically distributed with a strong presence in the UK as
well as the US, although with far fewer representatives outside of the Anglo-American
world. Examples of UK core actors include the members of the original Darwin@LSE group
such as Helena Cronin, Geoffrey Miller and Dylan Evans, as well as philosophers such as
Janet Radcliffe Richards. I would argue that this second group has also included prominent
science writers such as Robert Wright and Matt Ridley, who have been very active in
contributing to and promoting evolutionary psychology through their books and writing in
the UK media. Today, the most important academic society for evolutionary psychology is
the Human Behavior and Evolution Society (HBES): its journal Evolution and Human
Behavior has been one of the central academic sites for publication on the subject.17 Other
important journals include Behavioural and Brain Sciences, and Human Nature: an
Interdisciplinary Biosocial Perspective.
So what do evolutionary psychologists themselves say when they are trying to define
what they do? The following statement comes from what one of my interviewees described
as a “manifesto” for evolutionary psychology, written by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby,
arguably the originators of the term, and authors of the first academic papers to use it.
Evolutionary psychology is an approach to psychology, in which knowledge and
principles from evolutionary biology are put to use in research on the structure of the
human mind. It is not an area of study, like vision, reasoning, or social behavior. It is a
way of thinking about psychology that can be applied to any topic within it. (Cosmides
and Tooby, 1997: 1)
Although science writer Robert Wright described EP in his book The Moral Animal (1994)
as a “new science,” Cosmides and Tooby avoid such concrete definitions, and often resist
characterization of evolutionary psychology as a discrete discipline. In other places, they
and others have referred to it as a “new paradigm,” either for psychology or the social
sciences more widely (e.g. Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby, 1992; Buss, 1995). Figure 2
comes from an online resource of essays about the philosophy of mind, which uses cartoons
as a way of highlighting the central concepts of each essay. In this case, the cartoonist
reinforces one of the most central concepts and definitions given by the proponents of
evolutionary psychology. This, as suggested by the name itself, is that evolutionary
psychology is “the combination of two sciences—evolutionary biology and cognitive
psychology” (Evans and Zarante, 1999: 3) or as indicated here, what happens when Darwin
and “the brain” get together.
Such initial definitions are often quite broad, but closer examination reveals several
theoretical ideas that distinguish evolutionary psychology from other evolutionary ap-
proaches to humans. Figure 3 comes from a popular science website, Evolution’s Voyage,
and illustrates some other defining characteristics of evolutionary psychology ideas.
Again, the image of the exposed brain is important as a symbol of the object of study
of cognitive psychology. Cognitive psychology has traditionally been an area of psychol-
ogy strongly aligned towards the natural sciences, often using models of the mind based on
computing metaphors and allied with neuroscience, computer science and artificial
intelligence. As with the previous image, the exposed brain represents the mind and the
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two are seen as synonymous, reflecting the materialist stance of cognitive psychology. The
circles labeled “laughter,” “language,” “sexual attraction” and so on indicate a specific
model of the mind held by evolutionary psychologists: massive modularity. The massive
modularity thesis sees the mind as made up of many independent units, each of which
handles a specific task, such as language. This model was developed out of earlier ideas
about modularity developed in cognitive psychology (Fodor, 1983), but massive mod-
ularity is still controversial within that discipline (e.g. Fodor, 2000). The representation of
these modules is interesting, with the gray color and three-dimensional shapes recalling the
exposed physical brain, but the labeled circles on the brain’s surface also recall the
nineteenth century study of phrenology, which evolutionary psychologists often claim as a
precursor to their own science (see, e.g., Evans and Zarante, 1999: 37).20 The image also
looks to be one of a monkey, thereby symbolizing human origins and links with other
animals, as well as evolutionary psychology’s connections with biology through evolution-
Figure 2. Image by Enrico Biondi, taken from the essay, “Evolutionary Psychology” on the
website A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.18
Figure 3. Image by Alex Hughes, taken from “What is Evolutionary Psychology?” on the
website Evolution’s Voyage.19
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ary theory. The addition of Darwinism brings evolutionary psychologists further towards
the natural sciences, thus lending them the relatively greater epistemological authority of
biology. Another important concept is the idea that “our modern skulls house a Stone Age
mind”—that our minds are adapted for an ancestral environment and haven’t changed
since (though the environment has), sometimes paraphrased as “caveman psychology”
(Cosmides and Tooby, 1997). Finally, evolutionary psychologists also stress their interest
in the universal features of human psychology and behavior, rather than in differences
between groups of people, such as ethnic groups, an important distinction to which I will
return later.
“Broad” and “narrow” evolutionary psychology
However, these definitions of evolutionary psychology as laid out by its proponents in the
US and UK, are frequently contested by other actors with an interest in the area. As well as
the core evolutionary psychologists, in the UK there is a broader spread of academics who,
like evolutionary psychologists, use evolutionary theory in their work and study human
beings, but do so using a broader variety of theoretical models and empirical methodologies.
These researchers also come from a different grouping of academic disciplines, ones more
traditionally associated with evolutionary studies, such as neurobiology, evolutionary
biology, physical and paleo anthropology, behavioral genetics, paleontology, ethology (the
study of animal behavior), and primatology. In general, these disciplines are better
established in academia than evolutionary psychology is, but are also the origin of many of
the theoretical concepts currently in use by evolutionary psychologists. On the whole, these
researchers have in common an orientation, location or history leaning towards the
biological natural sciences, and to the theoretical approaches of sociobiology and behavioral
ecology. The complexity of the situation is such that I can only give here a generalized sense
of these relationships, but it is also one in which the notion of a disciplinary ecology can
certainly be applied, with the associated ideas of constant change and interaction between
the actors and groupings concerned.
The term “sociobiology” was coined in 1975 by the American entomologist E.O.
Wilson in his book Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, in which he described his vision of
how to apply the concepts of evolutionary biology to the study of behavior. As the title
suggests, the book brought together empirical research on animal behavior whilst showing
how those findings were consistent with theoretical ideas in evolutionary biology. It was his
final chapter, in which Wilson extended these arguments to humans, where the trouble
started. The Sociobiology debate, largely sustained from the mid 1970s until the late 1980s,
had many features in common with the 1990s controversy over evolutionary psychology. It
was launched and sustained through a number of semi-popular books and “public” events;
involved protracted, bitter and public controversy between academics from a range of
disciplines; and was concerned with contemporary political issues, as well as the boundary
between the natural and social sciences. A full discussion of the Sociobiology controversy is
far beyond the remit of this paper; however, it is important for understanding the current
situation to take this previous episode into account, as well as to understand that
sociobiology did not begin with, end with or exclusively comprise the writings of E.O.
Wilson. In parallel and prior to the American work of Wilson and his colleagues, the British
tradition of ethology (animal behavior) research had developed alongside theoretical
evolutionary biology to create something very like Wilson’s Sociobiology: the more UK
based tradition of behavioral ecology. In 1976, the then ethologist Richard Dawkins
published the classic work of popular science, The Selfish Gene, describing a view of
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evolution as operating at the level of individual genes, rather than organisms, populations or
species. The traditions represented by Wilson and Dawkins were interrelated from the start
and rapidly moved together to strongly influence many areas of biology, but particularly
“whole organism” disciplines, such as population biology and studies of animal behavior.
This means that although public disputes over Sociobiology and humans have long since
subsided, in academia there are many scientists who would still describe themselves as
sociobiologists or behavioral ecologists (see Brown, 1999 and Segerstrale, 2000, for further
discussions of this period).
In her research on the history of primatology, Amanda Rees argues that primatologists
adopted sociobiology in the 1970s and 1980s because it provided a strong theoretical
framework for a field of study that had previously worked largely within an empirical,
descriptive “natural history” tradition (Rees, 2001a, 2001b). This theoretical framework
helped to bring primatology further towards the natural sciences and reinforced its status as
“science,” rather than the atheoretical, semi-amateur Victorian tradition of natural history.
This holds not only for primatology, but also for studies of animal behavior in general, as
described here by one of Rees’ informants:
Sociobiology, or what can be spoken of, “more broadly under the label of behavioural
ecology, what it boils down to is asking not just the old question of what do the animals
do but in addition, asking the question, ‘If they are well adapted, what should they be
doing and how close does the one match the other?’ This is the kind of thinking that has
really revolutionised animal behaviour in general, not just primate field studies.” (Rees,
2001a: 233)
It seems more than possible that psychologists, who tend to work in one of a half-dozen or
more competing schools of psychological thought, may feel a similar need for unity and a
more coherent theoretical underpinning to their work (e.g. Richards, 2002). These comments
also highlight the ambiguity felt by many academics around the term “sociobiology,” with
“behavioral ecology” sometimes being adopted as an alternative name for the area. This is
particularly common amongst UK academics, where the behavioral ecology tradition
developed, but the boundary between the two is quite flexible, as I found when exploring it
with my interviewees. Academics identifying closely with evolutionary psychology seemed
aware of the term “behavioral ecology,” but were very unclear on what it might mean. Some
felt that the two were synonymous, or that it was pointless trying to make such distinctions,
whilst others (tending towards the ethology tradition) seemed much keener to make a strong
distinction between the two. At the same time, there were others who quite pragmatically
identified the “behavioral ecology” label as a tactic used to avoid the public notoriety or
political connotations of sociobiology, or to distance a British research tradition from a
North American one.
So when developing their arguments, evolutionary psychologists had to emphasize the
newness of their approach, and its difference from the many others in this crowded arena.
One of the key ways in which this was done was to stress the importance of (human)
psychology in evolutionary psychology, as compared with the sociobiology/ethology tradi-
tion of studying animal and human behavior, hence the emphasis on the human mind/brain
in the above definitions. This movement between “general” and “specific” definitions of
evolutionary psychology is well illustrated in this comment from a “core” EP academic and
popular author:
It’s just Darwinian theory applied to human beings, that’s all, just as simple as that. I
think the one thing I would add, is that there are so many wrong ways of applying it in
general to any species, and to any problem, but in particular people seem to find even
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more wrong ways of doing it when you get to humans. But this, the key that this
approach has developed and is obviously right, is not to try to explain human behavior
as the adaptations, but to look at the adaptations in the mental and physical adaptations
that natural selection has laid down, and then those generate forms of behavior, and
different behavior under different conditions, and one of the problems is to look at,
given this mental inheritance and psychological inheritance, under what sorts of
conditions might you expect what to occur. It’s just being Darwinian, at humans.
(R3—academic, evolutionary psychology; popular author)
This response also emphasizes the contributions of cognitive psychology to evolutionary
psychology, important in the theoretical concept of massive modularity, and some of the
methodological approaches used in EP research. Part of the reason for this distancing can be
seen in the arguments of opponents of evolutionary psychology, who tend to describe it as
part of a much larger continuum of evolutionary approaches to studying humans, as seen
here:
Look, I mean I date the whole recent, sort of the whole history of the current interest in
sociobiology, evolutionary psychology right back through the 1970s. Really I would
date its starting point to when Jensen wrote his paper on IQ, back in 1969.
(R18—academic author, neurobiology)
This view of evolutionary psychology, as continuous with previous “biological” approaches
to humans, serves obvious rhetorical purposes, by linking it with more politically con-
servative traditions such as race-IQ theory, social Darwinism and eugenics (see, e.g., Dusek,
1999; Rose and Rose, 2000 for similar views).
However, the boundary between sociobiology and evolutionary psychology was also
regarded as weak or unimportant by other academics involved in evolutionary studies, who
were not direct opponents of evolutionary psychology. For example, in this interview with
Richard Dawkins, carried out by the evolutionist, Darwin@LSE’s online magazine,21
Dawkins is skeptical of evolutionary psychology’s claims to novelty:
the evolutionist: Surely there’s quite a difference between the way evolutionary theory
is used in evolutionary psychology, than the kind used in the less sophisticated areas of
sociobiology?
Dawkins: So you say; it’s not obvious to me. Sounds like a new name for the same
subject. What do you think is the difference?
the evolutionist: The main difference is surely the emphasis on psychology . . . (Curry,
1997)
Dawkins’ view was reflected by those of many of the people I spoke to with a longstanding
research involvement with evolution and humans: that evolutionary psychology is basically
the same thing as sociobiology. Others were skeptical of the need for this kind of labeling,
questioning the utility of “marching under banners,” or using “cheap slogans.” The
following comment, from an academic involved in sociobiological research for many years,
reflects this ambivalence:
I was an evolutionary psychologist before the word had been invented . . . and I think I
didn’t notice what was happening, that in other people’s minds evolutionary psychology
had come to mean a much narrower branch of science, that not only was about the
issues of evolution and psychology, but a particular theoretical framework . . . So I’ve
been in a bit of a dilemma, I don’t want to abandon the term evolutionary psychology
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. . . But it’s become a bit of an albatross, because it now identifies you with a particular
church within this field, many of whose ideas I don’t actually hold with.
(R10—academic, sociobiology, psychology; popular author)
Often this discussion was conducted in terms of there being “broad” and “narrow” versions
(often termed “churches”) of evolutionary psychology, with several actors expressing the
hope or belief that the publicly visible label could be coopted by a broader movement of
more varied approaches to evolution and humans.22 At other times, a more pragmatic
boundary was drawn by assigning “sociobiology” to the evolutionary study of animals, and
“evolutionary psychology” to the evolutionary study of humans.
In spite, or perhaps because of all the distinctions made by academics, media
professionals expressed quite different attitudes:
I don’t think the majority; certainly the majority of the mainstream media really have
the sophistication to distinguish between evolutionary psychology, social Darwinism,
social biology, ordinary, in inverted commas, psychology. I think all these things tend
to be sort of bundled up together: when I do pieces or with the World Service do pieces,
which touch evolutionary psychology, we do make the distinction . . . but that
distinction is not always clear, or is sometimes difficult to make. (R14—radio producer,
science broadcaster)
Although most seemed aware of the stated differences between sociobiology and evolution-
ary psychology, they felt that such boundary attempts were at best difficult and at worst
unimportant and unhelpful when trying to discuss evolution in media contexts. This is
reflected in media coverage of the subject, where the term itself was sometimes avoided to
concentrate instead on specific issues (for example, gender differences). So if these
distinctions are not made in the public domain, then why is it important to understand them
at all? The label of “evolutionary psychology” has quite clearly become a publicly
recognized term, and one that has now largely eclipsed “sociobiology,” at least in UK press
coverage (Cassidy, 2005). Therefore, the ability to own this label, to be identified with it in
the public domain as well as in academia, is a powerful one, and something that actors in
popular evolutionary psychology have vied to attain.
Natural and social sciences
As I have described, the core-set of evolutionary psychologists tended to work in disciplines
such as cognitive psychology or parts of philosophy; areas which are strongly oriented
towards positivism and the natural sciences, particularly via subjects such as artificial
intelligence. However, these subjects are at present mostly located in social science,
humanities, or perhaps in computer science departments, whereas researchers in “broad”
evolutionary psychology work in a complex of disciplines around and in the biological
sciences. Many academics in these disciplines, who have been working in the area for many
years, have an ambiguous relationship with evolutionary psychology, whereby they feel
broadly allied to it through a shared commitment to evolutionary theory, but feel uncomfort-
able in being identified too closely with it. At the same time, the mainstream of most social
science disciplines, such as psychology or sociology, does not use biological or evolutionary
ideas, and generally looks to psychological, social, political and cultural explanations for
understanding why people do the things that they do. For example, ideas about the social
construction of gender stress the roles of upbringing, social norms and cultural experiences
in creating modern systems of gender and sexuality, rather than evolutionary forces. Another
important area of difference can be seen in the current emphasis in the social sciences and
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humanities on the importance of differences and variations across cultures and historical
periods, as opposed to EP’s interest in “human universals.” This means that social scientists
using evolutionary ideas have tended to be in a minority within their own disciplines,
leaving many evolutionary psychologists in isolated or marginalized positions. An indication
of this feeling can be seen in evolutionary psychologists’ frequent use of the following
quotation, from philosopher of science Max Plank:
A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them
see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation
grows up that is familiar with it. (Planck, 1949: 33–4, cited in Kuhn, 1996)
This was quoted several times during interviews with evolutionary psychologists, as well as,
for example, in discussions on a widely used mailing list, usually in the context of relations
with other social scientists.23 The implications here seem to be twofold: that it is not possible
to convince their opponents of the rightness of their arguments; and that persuasion of
students and younger scientists might prove more promising.
During the 1970s, E.O. Wilson argued that Sociobiology provided the means for a
“scientific” study of human behavior, in which the social sciences would ultimately be
subsumed into the natural sciences (in the form of biology).24 In response to these and
similar ambitions, the sociologist Hilary Rose asks whether evolutionary psychology is
“colonising the social sciences?,” and concludes that this is indeed the case (Rose, 2000).
Although this seems a fairly accurate description of the ambitions of Wilson and many early
sociobiologists, it does seem that evolutionary psychologists’ attitudes to social science may
be more complex. Sociobiology was and is practiced most often in the (biological) natural
sciences, whilst a definite new feature of evolutionary psychology is its presence and origins
in the social sciences, albeit positivist traditions within those disciplines. In The Adapted
Mind (Barkow et al., 1992), an edited book laying out the basic premises of evolutionary
psychology, EP is described as a “new paradigm” for the social sciences, suggesting
something a bit different from Wilson’s decidedly colonialist ambitions. Rather than
subsuming the social sciences into biology, the intent seems to be to maintain the social
sciences as separate disciplines for studying humans, but to instead transform how this is
done. Hence the mobilization of Kuhn’s (1962) imagery of “scientific revolutions” and
“paradigms,” which, in this context also fits well with the usage of Max Planck (adding the
implication that evolutionary psychology can transform the social sciences from within). In
the first chapter of The Adapted Mind, Tooby and Cosmides set out a critique of what they
described as the “Standard Social Science Model” (SSSM) of studying how humans work.
They characterized this model as one ignorant of the role of biology and evolution in
forming human minds, behavior and culture, thereby cutting off the social sciences from the
natural sciences. What emerges from the piece is less of an attack upon all social science per
se, than a critique of interpretive and qualitative approaches to social and psychological
research. Experimental approaches, utilized more frequently in psychology (especially
cognitive psychology) and physical anthropology, are held up as better, more “scientific”
alternatives throughout the rest of the book (Barkow et al., 1992). This attack must be seen
in the context of longstanding splits in the social sciences: roughly between interpretive and
positivist research philosophies; and broadly corresponding divisions between quantitative
and qualitative methodologies. A very rough characterization of these positions might be
that positivist approaches attempt to study humans in the same way as the rest of the natural
world, using (largely) quantitative data and experimental methodologies. Interpretive
approaches stress the importance of meaning and intention in humans’ thoughts and actions,
arguing that we need to be studied in different ways to the natural world, with a greater
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emphasis on qualitative data and different methodologies such as interviewing, analysis of
discourse and ethnography (Hughes, 1990; Malik, 2000).
Such conflicts within the social sciences can be seen most sharply in anthropology,
where physical anthropologists use quantitative measures of people and cultures, whilst
most social anthropologists reject these approaches and instead investigate the particularities
of contemporary human cultures, using participant-observation techniques and ethnography
instead. This split is perhaps one of the most severe in the social sciences, with the two
groups rarely communicating, and controversy between the two becoming increasingly
acrimonious.25 Interestingly, it is physical anthropologists such as John Tooby and Donald
Symons who provide the most direct links between the (mostly) older sociobiology and
(mostly) younger evolutionary psychology research communities. Parallel arguments have
developed in the humanities, where newer, socially influenced perspectives on the history
and philosophy of science are still strongly contested by traditional positivist philosophers of
science; many of whom also work in philosophy of mind (closely aligned to cognitive
psychology).26 With this in mind, it is perhaps less surprising that there were also links
between evolutionary psychology debates and the science wars in the UK: two of the most
prominent “science warriors” in the UK, Richard Dawkins and Lewis Wolpert, are both
allied to evolutionary psychology. A “science wars” book was written by one of the few
professors of evolutionary psychology in the UK (Dunbar, 1995); and the topic was
frequently discussed on the evolutionary psychology mailing list (which science warrior par
excellence Paul Gross also subscribes and contributes to). Finally, the last of the Darwin-
@LSE seminars in 1998 was a public debate between Alan Sokal and Bruno Latour.
Sociologist of science Ullica Segerstrale remarks upon this in her history of the sociobiology
debates, arguing that the science wars were a struggle for “the cultural authority of science”
(Segerstrale, 2000: 340).27 This would concur with Thomas Gieryn’s conclusion that the
science wars controversies were themselves episodes of boundary work, in which the
traditional autonomy and authority of science were defended, whilst attacking the legitimacy
of social scientists to be studying the content, practices and conclusions in the first place
(Gieryn, 1999; 336–62).
Despite such conflicts, interpretive social scientists have not on the whole become very
involved in public controversies over evolutionary psychology in the UK. Neurobiologists,
geneticists and sociobiologists have all become involved, while those sociologists and
interpretive psychologists acting in the public domain have largely been feminists, more
directly concerned with the gender aspects of evolutionary psychology arguments. A
possible exception to this might be Anthony Giddens, director of the LSE, and during the
1990s one of the most publicly visible sociologists in the UK, who has argued on his website
for the need to defend the social sciences “against the current trend toward the natural
sciences” (Giddens, 1999). However, I have not come across any other public intervention
from him on the subject, nor have I observed many other interpretive social scientists
arguing against evolutionary psychology in popular forms or public spaces such as the mass
media. Considering the ferocity of evolutionary psychology’s attacks on the interpretive
social sciences, this lack of visible response is curious, and should perhaps be a cause for
concern in these subjects, especially in the light of opinions such as these:
I think evolutionary psychology has a tremendous amount to offer to the social sciences,
the old-fashioned social sciences, in fact I don’t think they can do without it. I mean,
basically sociology is terribly short of ideas, talk to Anthony Giddens or someone and
try to find some interesting intellectual ideas there—it won’t work, because there’s
nothing there. (R10—academic, sociobiology, psychology; popular author)
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Giddens’ near solitary position as a “visible sociologist” in the UK meant that he often
became, by default, representative of all social sciences in this country. As such, his political
stance and close alignment with the Blair government is of particular concern considering
natural science critiques of the social sciences as contentless and politically loaded. An
important part of the “turf wars” being carried out around evolutionary psychology is, like
many past disputes over evolution and humans, a conflict between the natural and social
sciences. However, unlike previous episodes such as the Sociobiology debate, this is also,
very importantly, a conflict between two radically different visions of, and approaches to,
the social sciences. Evolutionary psychology’s version of social science is a positivist,
scientific (or scientistic) one, and it is crucially engaged in an attempt to convert both
internal and external understandings of the social sciences to match that vision.
Evolutionary psychology as “science”
Finally, evolutionary psychology often breaches the boundaries generally drawn around
science, separating it from the rest of society, as described above in the work of Turner,
Gieryn, and Bucchi. This has happened in two important, but really quite different ways.
Firstly, evolutionary psychology’s subject matter (studying humans) brings it intrinsically
closer to the non-scientific worlds of politics and everyday knowledge about people.
Secondly, the movement of evolutionary psychology debates into the public domain has
brought with it the attendant risks faced by any scientist undertaking popular work: that they
will lose credibility in the academic domain. This wobbly line, between academic and
popular science, is one that both evolutionary psychologists and their opponents have
walked during the course of the debate.
If, as Donna Haraway (1986) has argued, “primatology is politics by other means”
because the scientific study of apes and monkeys so often becomes an allegory for human
politics and society, then surely evolutionary psychology, the scientific study of humans,
must run the risk of being seen as “simply politics”? Indeed, the evolutionary psychology
claims that have received the most public attention have on the whole been intensely
political ones, albeit not in the conventional sense of “party politics.” Claims about the
nature of heterosexual desire and gender differences; the root causes of child abuse; and the
origins of the “glass ceiling” are all inherently political. This is especially true when they are
presented as speaking to policy and policymakers, as happened when Darwin@LSE
launched its program in a joint publication with the UK liberal/left think-tank Demos.28
Such proximity to the political arena has given rise to one of the most important criticisms
of evolutionary psychology (also at stake in previous controversies about biology and
humans), that such science is biased towards, or can provide scientific justifications for
particular political agendas. An important distancing tactic and counterargument used by
evolutionary psychologists is the invocation of a philosophical principle known as the
“naturalistic fallacy.” This principle, originating in the arguments of David Hume and G.E.
Moore, argues that it is a mistake to infer an “ought” statement (of how a particular situation
should be) from an “is” statement (of how things actually are) (Radcliffe Richards, 2000:
230). Following this, evolutionary psychologists argue that their science merely investigates
the “is” of human nature, and says nothing about the “ought”—i.e. political or moral
arguments about how people should live. Such arguments help to demarcate between the
claims that evolutionary psychologists make about people and the political implications of
these claims, or the uses that others might make of them.29 They bolster evolutionary
psychology claims of making objective, scientific truths about human nature, and dele-
gitimize criticisms of evolutionary psychology made on political grounds (that EP is sexist,
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racist, and so on), by making critics guilty of committing this fallacy and of being motivated
by politics or even “ideology,” rather than science or a concern for the “truth.” The
naturalistic fallacy is often treated as if it is a law of nature, without any discussion on why
it is a mistake to infer how things should be from a statement of how they are. However,
within the evolutionary community, this principle is not universally accepted, most notably
by E.O. Wilson himself, who argues that all human endeavors, including politics and
morality, should be derived from science (see Wilson, 1998; Segerstrale, 2000: ch.18).
As well as constructing a demarcation between itself and the domain of politics in
general, evolutionary psychology must distance itself from conservative politics in partic-
ular. This is a particularly important part of the boundary work carried out between
evolutionary psychology and sociobiology, because of the very strong impacts of earlier
leftwing critiques of sociobiology ideas. Evolutionary psychologists have done this by
associating themselves with liberal/left politics, particularly during the early New Labour
(UK) and Clinton Democrat (US) era of the mid and late 1990s. As well as their work with
Demos during this period, a think-tank formed just prior to Labour’s election to power in
1997, a good example of this general strategy can be seen in the Darwinism Today
publication A Darwinian Left, written by philosopher Peter Singer (1999). Similarly, several
evolutionary psychologists have written of themselves as feminists, and argued that their
ideas are compatible with feminism (see, e.g. Cronin, 1999). Finally, evolutionary psycholo-
gists have had to create a boundary between themselves and evolutionary arguments about
race in particular. This is largely because of the long history of evolutionary thought about
race, which continues into the present day with behavioral geneticists’ arguments about race
and IQ, still visible in the public domain (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994). Evolutionary
psychologists argue that they are only interested in features that are “human universals,” not
in individual or group differences, and so are not interested in race. This position is
underlined by their adoption of Dawkins’ (1976) arguments that evolutionary selection
occurs at the genetic, rather than group or species level. Some evolutionary psychologists
even claim to be researching the evolutionary underpinnings of racism itself, in order to help
combat it (Kurzban, Tooby and Cosmides, 2001).
The movement of the evolutionary psychology debate so strongly into the public
domain has also meant that participants have had to negotiate the fine line between
legitimate “popularization” and less legitimate publicity seeking, sensationalism, egoism and
so on, as lampooned in the “Evolutionary War” cartoon discussed at the beginning of this
article. In recent years there have been significant shifts, especially in the UK, in the location
of this boundary with government, funding bodies and scientific institutions all offering
advice, support and incentives for scientists to communicate their work in the public
domain. The popular science boom of the 1990s has also made it much more respectable for
scientists to engage in popular communication. Such shifts can also be seen in exemplary
events, such as the election of Richard Dawkins as a Fellow of the UK’s Royal Society in
2001, “for his work on evolution and for raising the public understanding of science” (Royal
Society, 2001). Although the space for legitimate popular science is probably far bigger
today than it has been for many years, scientists do still need to protect their domain of
expertise, often by using popular science itself as a tool to do this (e.g. Mellor, 2003). There
are still potential risks for scientists in undertaking popular communication, as described by
this senior academic:
So it can be a mistake for academics to think they can do what John Brockman says
they can do, which is go directly to the public with their ideas . . . It can be a mistake for
scientists to do this and I think it can particularly be a mistake for young scientists, to
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do this. They see the grand examples of the Pinkers and the Dawkins and think, “I can
do that”, and they’re going to find that that may be the end of their career. You still have
to earn your brownie points by publishing in the right journals and doing the right
things. (R10—academic, sociobiology, psychology; popular author)30
Overenthusiastic, excessive or premature (in terms of the science or of the career of the
scientist) popular discussions of science can still be seen as illegitimate, especially from
within the academic arena. This meant that rhetorical manipulation of the category “popular
science” occurred throughout evolutionary psychology debates, despite the obvious influ-
ence of popular books in the area. For example, in this review of Alas Poor Darwin (2000),
evolutionary psychologist Geoffrey Miller critiques the book for focusing only on the
“popularized” version of evolutionary psychology while ignoring the “real science” in
academia:
The “evolutionary psychology” castigated here is not the modern science of human
nature as it is actually developing, but a simplified, out-dated, third hand version that
focuses too much on the writings of the field’s best known popularisers such as Steven
Pinker, David Buss, Matt Ridley and Dan Dennett. (Miller, 2000a)
However, when doing popular work, those aspects of evolutionary psychology seen as most
relevant to people’s everyday lives must be further emphasized in order to boost the
subject’s popular appeal. Therefore, evolutionary psychology’s problematic boundaries
between science, politics and everyday knowledge must be pushed even further by the move
into the public domain. When discussing popular evolutionary psychology, both academics
and media professionals felt the need to draw a line between “good” and “bad” popular
science, by putting forward examples that, for them, fell outside the boundaries of
legitimacy.
And there’s all that rather dubious stuff about hip to waist ratios, which I have to say I
find some of the least convincing of all this stuff, let alone Thornhill and whatsisname
on rape, which is just kind of . . . [trails off]. And of course those people let the side
down horribly; I was trying to tell X, that rape book was just . . . [again lost for words].
And of course the media love that! Because it’s so over the top, and explosive and all
that, it’s kind of the more sensible you are the less interested they are in you.
(R13—nonfiction publishing editor)31
Importantly, this also shows how scientific boundary work is carried out not only by
scientists and scientific institutions, but also by and in the interests of actors throughout
society.
4. Discussion and conclusions
Since the early 1990s, evolutionary psychology has challenged, reconstituted or reinforced
boundaries within and around the sciences at almost every level: in the complex disciplinary
ecology around studies of evolution and humans; within the social sciences; at their interface
with the natural sciences; and at the demarcations made between science and the rest of
society. At the same time, evolutionary psychologists have made concerted efforts to make
their arguments in the public domain of the UK media, through writing popular books and
press articles, giving public lectures, and appearing on television and radio programs. This
has also happened with academics and others who disagree with evolutionary psychology
claims, creating a public controversy that continued through the late 1990s and early 2000s.
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Crucially, the evolutionary psychology controversy has been a highly interdisciplinary one,
involving academics and writers from across the natural sciences, social science and
humanities.
As I described earlier, a growing body of research in sociology and history of science
has traced links between discussions of science in the public domain, the establishment of
legitimacy for research activities, and the boundary work carried out within and around the
sciences. However, to simply outline the coincidence of interdisciplinary conflict and public
discussion in the case of evolutionary psychology is not really sufficient to make the case
that they are linked. As I described earlier, other factors, such as the relevance of
evolutionary psychology arguments to everyday life and to contemporary political issues,
have probably also contributed to pulling the subject into the public domain of the mass
media, and I will be exploring these suggestions in my ongoing work. However, one thing
that boundary work and public science do have in common is audiences: the people
evolutionary psychologists and their opponents were attempting to convince in making their
arguments. As Massimiano Bucchi has argued, in cases of deviation, “popular science” is
often not exclusively aimed at the wider “public” at all, citing the cold fusion case as a
prime example of this:
In such a case one could even argue that, just as happens for a certain form of political
discourse, scientists’ discourse at the public level is only apparently “public”: commu-
nication at this level is not actually meant to address the public, but to send “coded
messages” to colleagues without having to conform to the constraints of specialist
communication. (Bucchi, 1996: 380)
Although this study can say nothing about the actual audiences or publics of popular
evolutionary psychology, it has been possible to investigate what the intended audiences
were: the social worlds that actors in popular evolutionary psychology were attempting to
reach. In the UK, coverage of evolutionary psychology was not spread evenly across the
entire mass media, but was instead largely concentrated in specific sites, such as the
broadsheet press, news magazines, and upmarket broadcasting sites with elite audiences,
such as Channel 4 and Radio 4 (Cassidy, 2005). When asked who they believed the
audiences for popular evolutionary psychology were, both academics and media profession-
als gave an initial response that they had no idea what or who the audiences for EP were.
However, many would continue by discussing their intuitions of whom they thought or
hoped that they were talking with. For academics, publishers and journalists alike, the most
frequently mentioned audience was an elite, professional educated one, and invariably the
idea of academics and scientists as audiences was seen as extremely important:
So that’s why the other academics read these books: if you ring up, if I ring up any of
my academic colleagues, prominent academics, the first thing we’ll talk on the phone is,
“have you read the new book by Matt Ridley, or Mark Ridley?” or, “have you read the
latest book by Brian Greene?”, or “what’s Richard Dawkins’ latest book like?”
Academics are reading those books, so that’s where the debate is happening.
(R6—academic, evolutionary psychology; popular author)
Furthermore, popular authors described how, for them, popular writing could be helpful for
their work in other ways, recalling the way in which Ulrike Felt (2000) has described the
public domain as a creative space for scientists, in which they can develop ideas in a more
speculative fashion than is allowable in academic journal publications.
But when I do popular science writing, I write with a popular science hat on, and to
some extent, they’re much more relaxed and I don’t claim that the research under-
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pinning them is meticulous, and I don’t intend it to be. So something like [book title],
I wrote it in three months. Now that was written kind of because it was fun to do, and
it was an interesting story to talk about, but also in the process I was kind of trying to
pull a whole load of disparate ideas together in my own mind, all these things I’d been
doing, trying to make sense of them, and academically that’s what that book did, but it
was really written to entertain. (R5—academic, behavioral ecology, evolutionary
psychology; popular author)
Therefore, UK actors in popular evolutionary psychology themselves understood it to be a
public scientific debate, one which could not occur in academia for a number of reasons. As
well as the fact that both the content of and participants in this debate cut completely across
preexisting disciplinary structures in academia, the theoretical and at times speculative
nature of evolutionary psychology was also a significant barrier to academic discussion of
the subject.
“Evolutionary psychology” was initially a term used by a distinct group of (largely US
based) academics emerging from the sociobiology community in the late 1980s and early
1990s. Unlike their predecessors, who were largely located in the biological natural science
disciplines, these researchers worked in social science subjects such as cognitive psychol-
ogy, and argued for a distinctive approach: a “new paradigm,” for both the social sciences
and for evolutionary studies of humans. The use of “evolutionary psychology” as a label
signaled both this distance from previous approaches, and its location in the social sciences,
whilst at the same time arguing strongly against other approaches within the social sciences.
A rapid move into the public domain, through popular science books and public lectures,
enabled these academics to develop their ideas and reach new allies in the UK and in their
own and other disciplines, at a stage when there was relatively little academic discussion of
the subject (Cassidy, 2005). These allies, particularly members of the Darwin@LSE group
in the UK, then continued to communicate in the public domain, not only by producing more
popular science and developing their ideas in this space, but also by networking between a
diverse group of academics and media professionals, including journalists and publishers.
Following this, a number of academics and writers, working from a range of disciplines also
mobilized in the public domain, for a variety of reasons, including protection of their own
subject, disagreement with the specific approach taken by evolutionary psychologists, or
political objections to the claims being made. This resulted in an atmosphere of debate in
media such as the press and popular science books, but also a wider recognition of the term.
In recent years, it seems that there has been a broadening of the meaning of “evolutionary
psychology,” to encompass most contemporary evolutionary approaches to studying hu-
mans. This means that, although initial moves into the public domain have been successful
in creating evolutionary psychology as a label that is widely recognized by academics,
media professionals and perhaps wider publics, the meaning of that label has shifted and
continues to do so, changing and developing over time.
Evolutionary psychology, as it appeared in the public domain of the UK, appears to be
a good example of Bucchi’s (1996) “deviation processes” in science communication. Such
processes are not necessarily “deviant” as such, but do not occur on a regular basis, and
when they do occur, it is usually under specific circumstances. As this and my previous
paper (Cassidy, 2005) have shown, evolutionary psychologists moved into the UK media,
putting their arguments directly in the form of popular science books, newspaper articles,
book reviews, public lectures, and broadcast appearances. In the early 1990s, evolutionary
psychology was a new approach to the evolutionary study of humans, positioning itself as
distinct from forerunners such as Sociobiology, through its theoretical approach, empirical
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methodologies, and locations in the social sciences and humanities. As I have described
here, evolutionary psychology contested scientific boundaries at almost every level, from the
immediate “disciplinary ecology” surrounding it, right up to the traditional distinctions made
between science and “non-science” (by moving so actively into the public domain). For
similar reasons to the evolutionary psychologists’, academics and authors with other
positions also moved into the public domain to contest evolutionary psychology claims and
boundary definitions. Unlike academics involved in examples such as cold fusion, evolution-
ary psychologists initially published their work in academic fora, on a small scale, but then
used mass media and popular science forms to reach broader, multidisciplinary audiences.
This process is particularly evident in citation rates for some popular books, the rise in
academic citations subsequent to media coverage of the subject, and the interview discus-
sions quoted here. Interestingly, evolutionary psychology textbooks have only started to
appear in recent years (e.g. Barrett, Dunbar and Lycett, 2001), signifying a degree of
academic maturity that did not exist in the previous decade. As this paper has shown, both
academics and media professionals involved with popular evolutionary psychology in the
UK themselves had a very good understanding of these processes, grounded in their own
experiences and intentions of doing popular science.
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Notes
1 I would see this shift into “the public domain” of the mass media to be very much in the vein of a move towards
acting in Habermas’ modern “public sphere” (Habermas, 1992).
2 New Scientist and Scientific American are very well known examples of popular science media. In a similar
vein, Annals of Improbable Research (AIR) is a US based science humor magazine with a prominent Web
presence, see http://www.improbable.com/ for further details. In addition, the genre of popular science books
can be seen similarly as science books with a shared audience of academics and “interested lay” readers.
3 See also Brooks (1998: 51) for similar use of this metaphor in discussion of a public spat between Stephen Jay
Gould and evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker (see Dennett, 1997; Gould, 1997a, 1997b; Pinker, 1997 for
further details).
4 To give a sense of scale, Hawking’s A Brief History of Time has only seven citations in the ISI’s Web of
Science database, whereas Dawkins’ Selfish Gene, now over 25 years old, also a popular science classic, has
over 1,500 in the past ten years alone, giving a strong indication of each book’s influence in academia.
5 Interview sources are cited with respondent (R) number, occupation and academic subject where appropriate. A
total of 21 semi-structured interviews were carried out over 1999 and 2000, 12 of which were with academics
and nine with media professionals.
6 I am very unsure that a “purely” symmetrical approach is at all possible in such an analysis; however, the
process of attempting it has proved to be invaluable in carrying out this research.
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7 It would be very difficult to give a more accurate estimate because of the problems in defining what can count
as an “evolutionary psychology” book.
8 In this text, I use “sociobiology” to refer to the academic field of study by that name, including its modern
forms; “Sociobiology” denotes the original controversy of the 1970s surrounding the publication of Wilson’s
book Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975).
9 John Brockman is a publishing agent, who represents many of the most famous and successful popular science
academic authors, including Richard Dawkins and Steven Rose. He is particularly famous for securing some
very large (six figure) advances from publishers for popular science books (see St. John, 1999).
10 Examples of such trends within popular science publishing might include “religiously” themed physics books,
or popular science history.
11 The choice of “Darwin@LSE” as a title seems to reflect the group’s orientation towards modernism, science
and technology, as well as the then dramatic rise of the Internet as a force in popular culture (see also their use
of the lowercase the evolutionist as a title for an online magazine, and their links with John Brockman and Edge
magazine, discussed below). See the Darwin@LSE website at http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/cpnss/darwin/
index.htm for further details.
12 Interview, R6—academic, evolutionary psychology; popular author.
13 Darwin@LSE was originally funded by several charitable foundations and private sponsors, and the public
program eventually closed for a combination of financial and personal reasons, whilst “work in progress”
meetings and private research continue to be undertaken. See: “Darwin@LSE: The story so far . . .” at http:/
/www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/cpnss/darwin/story.htm.
14 Media coverage of evolutionary topics in general is often linked with such “hooks,” particularly Darwin
anniversaries, such as the date of his death, or publication of the Origin (Caudill, 1989).
15 Although this ecological metaphor might be seen as potentially problematic in a study of relations between the
natural and social sciences, it is widely used in social worlds research, and by no means implies that society
operates in exactly the same way as an ecology. Furthermore, it is worth noting that sociologists have used the
ecological metaphor before, in the early part of the twentieth century, and in particular used it to help open up
a space for distinctly sociological enquiry, rather than allowing it to be reabsorbed into the natural sciences
(Gaziano, 1996).
16 For the record, I have an undergraduate training in psychology and zoology (largely carried out prior to
evolutionary psychology’s establishment in its current form), but a postgraduate training in sociology and
science studies. I would consider myself to be a social researcher who uses a qualitative-interpretive research
approach in conjunction with quantitative methodologies.
17 See http://www.hbes.com/ and http://www.science.mcmaster.ca/psychology/ehb/ehb.htm for further details of
these. Evolution and Human Behavior changed its name from Ethology and Sociobiology in 1996.
18 “Evolutionary Psychology” (Buller, 1998) on the website A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind (http:/
/host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/ep.htm).
19 “What is Evolutionary Psychology?” on the website Evolution’s Voyage by William A. Spriggs (http:/
/www.evoyage.com/Whatis.html).
20 Interestingly, phrenology itself had enormous popular appeal and was also the subject of huge controversy in
the public domain, as well as heavy boundary work during the nineteenth century (see Cooter, 1984; also
Shapin, 1979).
21 The use of lowercase font for the evolutionist magazine was purposeful: see note 11 above.
22 Several textbooks recently published on evolutionary psychology have actually stressed precisely this theme of
a “broad church” coming together under the label, see, e.g. Barrett, Dunbar and Lycett (2001).
23 This e-mail distribution list regularly posts details of new research and media reports relevant to EP, which are
then commented on by list members, many of whom are academics working in the area. This list is available to
members of the public, but by request only. It has been running since 1999 and at the time of writing has a little
over 3,500 members, largely in the US and UK. For further information see http://groups.yahoo.com/group/
evolutionary-psychology/ and http://human-nature.com/.
24 Wilson has built upon and elaborated these ideas in his more recent work, Consilience (Wilson, 1998).
25 A good example of this would be the controversy in 2000 over a book, Darkness in El Dorado (Tierney, 2000),
alleging that physical anthropologist and sociobiologist Napoleon Chagnon engaged in widespread abuses of
the Yanomamo Indians he studies. These claims resulted in bitter disputes between physical and social
anthropologists, including prominent evolutionary psychologists such as John Tooby (see his website http:/
/www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/eldorado/).
26 Several of the proponents of EP, such as Helena Cronin, Daniel Dennett, Janet Radcliffe Richards and Peter
Singer are philosophers, while the Darwin@LSE program was located in the Centre for Philosophy of Natural
and Social Science at the LSE.
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27 These connections have also been noted by Hilary Rose in her discussions of EP (Rose, 2000), as well as by
Malik (2000) and Collins (2000).
28 H. Cronin and O. Curry (2000) “Pity Poor Men,” Guardian 5 February; O. Curry, H. Cronin and J. Ashworth
(eds) (1996) “Matters of Life and Death: the World View from Evolutionary Psychology,” Demos Quarterly,
10. London: Demos.
29 This is particularly crucial considering the way in which far right organizations have in the past embraced
sociobiology to justify their views, and that the current leader of the British National Party continues to do so
with evolutionary psychology (see Toolis, 2000).
30 John Brockman’s ideas about the “Third Culture”: a public space for scientists to debate, have been very
influential on some evolutionary psychologists (see Brockman, 1995, and his website Edge, http:/
/www.edge.org/).
31 The hip–waist ratio work refers to research findings on men’s preferences for a particular kind of “curvy”
female figure (e.g. Singh, 1993). Thornhill and Palmer (2000) argue for the evolutionary origins of male–female
rape.
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